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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ANNOTATIONS
This section contains a digest of all reported decisions interpreting provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from the first week in
December, 1964, through the last week in February, 1965, in the National
Reporter System.
MARK L. COHEN
RONALD W. DELSESTO
W. JOSEPH ENGLER, JR.
GERALD E. FARRELL
RICHARD G. KOTARBA
PETER J. NORTON
STUART L. POTTER
VINCENT A. SIANO
HELEN SLOTNICK
ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation
by Agreement
ALLOWAY V. STUART
385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 9-402, infra.
SECTION 1-105. Territorial Application of the Act; Parties'
Power to Choose Applicable Law
PARK COUNTY IMPLEMENT CO. V. CRAIG
397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-401, infra.
SECTION 1-201. General Definitions
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRIB. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)	 [Section 1-201(3), (11)]
Annotated under Section 1-205, infra.
DAVID CRYSTAL, INC. V. CUNARD STEAM-SHIP Co.
223 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
	 [ Section 1-201 (15) ]
Cunard Steam-Ship Co., the defendant, transported by ocean carrier
goods owned by Crystal and consigned to Crystal's customs broker, Penson.
Upon arrival in New York, Cunard unloaded the goods and placed them
in the custody of Clarke, its stevedore. This was the usual procedure. Clarke
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would hold the goods until all freight charges were paid, then deliver them
upon presentment of a delivery order signed by the consignee. In the instant
case a carefully forged delivery order was procured through the complicity
of an employee of Penson and presented to the stevedore who thereupon
delivered the goods.
Crystal then brought suit in admiralty against Cunard for conversion of
the goods.
Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, to which the bill of lading in
the case was subject, the carrier's liability in ocean affreightment continues
until proper delivery of the cargo to the consignee, notwithstanding
contrary provisions in the bill of lading. Upon unloading, however, liability
changes from that of a carrier to that of a warehouseman and the stevedore
is deemed an agent of the carrier. However, because there is no explicit
rule in maritime law regarding liability of a warehouseman for misdelivery
of goods, the court set out to fashion a rule consistent with that prevailing
in commercial transactions on land.
The court looked to the Uniform Bill of Lading Act (UBLA), the
Federal Bill of Lading Act (FBLA), the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
(UWRA), the Restatement of Torts and the Uniform Commercial Code.
It noted that under the first three of these laws a bailee is absolutely liable
for misdelivery of goods. It then said, "The same result would follow under
Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code. . ." In an important caveat,
however, the court noted that the uniform acts could not under any cir-
cumstances be directly applicable in that the forged delivery order was not
the kind of document with which any of them dealt. It was not a warehouse
receipt under Section 1-201(45) of the UCC, nor was it a document of title
under Section 1-201(15). Being forged, it could
hardly be said of it that "in the regular course of business or
financing [it would be] treated as adequately evidencing that the
person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of
the document and the goods it covers."
Having thus disposed of the relevant uniform acts, the court explicitly
incorporated into maritime law Section 234 of the Restatement of Torts
which reads, "A bailee who delivers a chattel to one not entitled to its im-
mediate possession is liable to the bailor for a conversion of the chat-
tel. . ." This conclusion, the court said, alligned maritime law with the
law of the land. Cunard was liable for the misdelivery of goods by its agent.
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and
conclusion of the lower court. 339 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1964).
COMMENT
The court suggested that the delivery order, because forged, was not
a document of title as that term is defined by Section 1-201(15) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Therefore, delivery pursuant to such an order
was a misdelivery. It further suggested that under the Code, misdelivery
pursuant to a forged delivery order would result in absolute liability. This
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latter suggestion, while probably correct, is open to argument, for Section
7-404 provides:
A bailee who in good faith including the observance of reasonable
commercial standards has received goods and delivered or otherwise
disposed of them according to the terms of the document of title or
pursuant to this Article is not liable therefore. This rule applies
even though ... the person to whom he delivered the goods had no
authority to receive them.
The last sentence of the Official Comment to this section reads, "The
section applies . . . to delivery to the holder of an invalid document."
Whether the forged delivery order is "an invalid document," or, as the court
suggested, no document at all is unclear. But probably it is no document at
all. Section 7-404 would in that case be inapplicable. Evidence that Section
7-404 was not intended to excuse misdelivery, even if reasonable and made in
good faith, lies in the fact that the statutory antecedents which the Official
Comment cites do not under any circumstances excuse misdelivery. See § 10,
UWRA and y 13, UBLA.
Section 7-403 thus appears to be the only applicable section. This section
states that the bailee's obligation is to deliver the bailed goods to the person
entitled under the document. Though there are seven enumerated cir-
cumstances under which this obligation does not exist, misdelivery is not
one of them. Thus under Section 7-403 the bailee must deliver the goods to the
person entitled, even if he has misdelivered them to somebody else.
This whole problem could have been avoided if the draftsmen had
somewhere taken a stand and made their intention clear. Or it could have
been avoided by a tighter drafting of Section 7-404.
W.J.E., JR.
FORT KNOX NAT'L BANK V. GUSTAFSON
385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
	 [ Section 1-201 (19) ]
Annotated under Section 1-208, infra.
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
	 [Section 1-201(19)]
Annotated under Section 4-209, infra.
DLUGE V. ROBINSON
204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964)
	 [Section 1-201(20)]
Annotated under Section 3-804, infra.
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
	 [Section 1-201(25)]
Annotated under Section 4-209, infra.
DAVID CRYSTAL, INC. V. CUNARD STEAM-SHIP Co.
223 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
	 [Section 1-201 ( 45) ]
Annotated this section, supra.
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SECTION 1-204. Time; Reasonable Time; "Seasonably"
G. VANDENBERG & SONS, N.V. V. SITER
204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-607, infra.
SECTION 1-205. Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRIB. CO .
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
In February, 1962, the plaintiff-supply company mailed to the defendant-
distributing company a letter containing an offer to sell merchandise at
catalogue price (representing a mark-up of 20%) minus 11%. The offer was
never formally accepted; nevertheless, over the next two years more than
$850,000 worth of goods was purchased by the defendant, and all but
$40,000 was paid under billings computed in accordance with the price
formula set out in the plaintiff's offer. That $40,000 the plaintiff sued to
recover. The defendant defended and counterclaimed, alleging fraud and
misrepresentation. It contended that it was only obligated to pay cost plus
10%, this being an amount the defendant's negotiator was allegedly led
to believe would equal the price determined by the plaintiff's formula. The
defendant's position was that a computation based on its method would
show that it had been overpaying in that the plaintiff's costs were lower than
those suggested by the catalogue prices.
The court held that there was a binding contract between the parties and
that the price of the goods should be computed on the basis of the formula
prescribed in the plaintiff's offer. To support this holding, it gave great
weight to the parties' extensive course of dealing, quoting in order and also
verbatim,	 or	 nearly	 verbatim,	 Sections	 1-201(3),
	 1-201(11), 1-205(1),
1-205(3), 1-205(4)(a), 2-104(1), 2-104(3), 2-106(2), 2-201(1), 2-201(2),
2-201(3)(c), 2-202(a), 2-204(1), 2-204(2), 2-204(3), 2-206(1), 2-206(3)
and 2-208.
M.L.C.
SECTION 1-208. Option to Accelerate at Will
FORT KNOX NAT'L BANK V. GUSTAFSON
385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
The plaintiff-debtors executed in favor of the defendant-bank a joint
note secured by their mobile diner and by their leasehold interest in the land
on which the diner was situated. Under the terms of the security agreement,
the bank had the power to accelerate the maturity date of the note if the
plaintiffs defaulted in any of their monthly payments or if the bank deemed
itself insecure at any time. When the debtors experienced difficulties in
making their payments, the bank orally agreed that they could make them
one day short of bimonthly, so long as all the plaintiff's creditors went along.
The debtors continued to experience financial difficulties, however, falling be-
hind on their lease payments by eight months. Finally, when their landlord
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threatened to terminate the lease, the bank filed a claim and delivery action
to get possession of the diner. At the time, the plaintiffs had made twenty-two
of twenty-three monthly payments on their note. The bank ultimately dis-
posed of the diner and the plaintiffs brought the present action for abuse
of process. The trial court gave judgment to the debtors, awarding both
compensatory and punitive damages.
On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that regardless of
whether the bank had waived the defaults in monthly payments, it still had
the power under the second part of the acceleration clause to precipitate the
maturity date if it deemed itself insecure. Under Section 1-208, the bank
could deem itself insecure only if it did so in good faith, and the burden
of proving bad faith was on the debtors. "Good faith" was defined by Sec-
tion 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact." The court found that as a matter of
law the bank had accelerated on a good faith belief that it was insecure
and that a reversal was in order. The bank had effectively pursued its
right to possession by judicial process, given it by Section 9-503.
The court pointed out, however, that the record did not contain an
adequate account of the disposition of the diner. Under Section 9-504(3),
the bank was required to dispose of it in a "commercially reasonable" man-
ner. If it disposed of it in any other way, it was liable under Section 9-507
for whatever loss the plaintiffs could show resulted from improper disposition.
P.J.N.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions
O'BRIEN V. ISAACS
203 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, infra.
SECTION 2-104. Definitions: "Merchant"; "Between Merchants";
"Financing Agency"
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRIB. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-205, supra.
SECTION 2-106. Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement";
"Contract for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present
Sale"; "Conforming" to Contract;
"Termination"; "Cancellation"
O'BRIEN V. IsAAcs
203 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. 1965)
This action was brought to test the constitutionality of Section 42 of
the Illinois Retail Sales Regulations which taxed payments received by
Illinois florists for flowers delivered in Illinois pursuant to telegraphic
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